by
Oded Yinon
This
essay originally appeared in Hebrew in KIVUNIM (Directions), A
Journal for Judaism and Zionism; Issue No, 14--Winter, 5742, February 1982,
Editor: Yoram Beck. Editorial Committee: Eli Eyal, Yoram Beck, Amnon Hadari,
Yohanan Manor, Elieser Schweid. Published by the Department of
Publicity/The World Zionist Organization, Jerusalem.
At
the outset of the nineteen eighties the State of Israel is in need of a new
perspective as to its place, its aims and national targets, at home and abroad.
This need has become even more vital due to a number of central processes which
the country, the region and the world are undergoing. We are living today in
the early stages of a new epoch in human history which is not at all similar to
its predecessor, and its characteristics are totally different from what we
have hitherto known. That is why we need an understanding of the central
processes which typify this historical epoch on the one hand, and on the other
hand we need a world outlook and an operational strategy in accordance with the
new conditions. The existence, prosperity and steadfastness of the Jewish state
will depend upon its ability to adopt a new framework for its domestic and
foreign affairs.
This
epoch is characterized by several traits which we can already diagnose, and
which symbolize a genuine revolution in our present lifestyle. The dominant
process is the breakdown of the rationalist, humanist outlook as the major
cornerstone supporting the life and achievements of Western civilization since
the Renaissance. The political, social and economic views which have emanated
from this foundation have been based on several "truths" which are
presently disappearing--for example, the view that man as an individual is the
center of the universe and everything exists in order to fulfill his basic
material needs. This position is being invalidated in the present when it has
become clear that the amount of resources in the cosmos does not meet Man's
requirements, his economic needs or his demographic constraints. In a world in
which there are four billion human beings and economic and energy resources
which do not grow proportionally to meet the needs of mankind, it is
unrealistic to expect to fulfill the main requirement of Western Society,1 i.e., the wish and aspiration for
boundless consumption. The view that ethics plays no part in determining the
direction Man takes, but rather his material needs do--that view is becoming
prevalent today as we see a world in which nearly all values are disappearing.
We are losing the ability to assess the simplest things, especially when they
concern the simple question of what is Good and what is Evil.
The
vision of man's limitless aspirations and abilities shrinks in the face of the
sad facts of life, when we witness the break-up of world order around us. The
view which promises liberty and freedom to mankind seems absurd in light of the
sad fact that three fourths of the human race lives under totalitarian regimes.
The views concerning equality and social justice have been transformed by
socialism and especially by Communism into a laughing stock. There is no
argument as to the truth of these two ideas, but it is clear that they have not
been put into practice properly and the majority of mankind has lost the
liberty, the freedom and the opportunity for equality and justice. In this
nuclear world in which we are (still) living in relative peace for thirty years,
the concept of peace and coexistence among nations has no meaning when a
superpower like the USSR holds a military and political doctrine of the sort it
has: that not only is a nuclear war possible and necessary in order to achieve
the ends of Marxism, but that it is possible to survive after it, not to speak
of the fact that one can be victorious in it.2
The
essential concepts of human society, especially those of the West, are
undergoing a change due to political, military and economic transformations.
Thus, the nuclear and conventional might of the USSR has transformed the epoch
that has just ended into the last respite before the great saga that will demolish
a large part of our world in a multi-dimensional global war, in comparison with
which the past world wars will have been mere child's play. The power of
nuclear as well as of conventional weapons, their quantity, their precision and
quality will turn most of our world upside down within a few years, and we must
align ourselves so as to face that in Israel. That is, then, the main threat to
our existence and that of the Western world.3 The war over resources in the world,
the Arab monopoly on oil, and the need of the West to import most of its raw
materials from the Third World, are transforming the world we know, given that
one of the major aims of the USSR is to defeat the West by gaining control over
the gigantic resources in the Persian Gulf and in the southern part of Africa,
in which the majority of world minerals are located. We can imagine the
dimensions of the global confrontation which will face us in the future.
The
Gorshkov doctrine calls for Soviet control of the oceans and mineral rich areas
of the Third World. That together with the present Soviet nuclear doctrine
which holds that it is possible to manage, win and survive a nuclear war, in
the course of which the West's military might well be destroyed and its
inhabitants made slaves in the service of Marxism-Leninism, is the main danger
to world peace and to our own existence. Since 1967, the Soviets have
transformed Clausewitz' dictum into "War is the continuation of policy in
nuclear means," and made it the motto which guides all their policies.
Already today they are busy carrying out their aims in our region and
throughout the world, and the need to face them becomes the major element in
our country's security policy and of course that of the rest of the Free World.
That is our major foreign challenge.4
The
Arab Moslem world, therefore, is not the major strategic problem which we shall
face in the Eighties, despite the fact that it carries the main threat against
Israel, due to its growing military might. This world, with its ethnic
minorities, its factions and internal crises, which is astonishingly
self-destructive, as we can see in Lebanon, in non-Arab Iran and now also in
Syria, is unable to deal successfully with its fundamental problems and does
not therefore constitute a real threat against the State of Israel in the long
run, but only in the short run where its immediate military power has great
import. In the long run, this world will be unable to exist within its present
framework in the areas around us without having to go through genuine
revolutionary changes. The Moslem Arab World is built like a temporary house of
cards put together by foreigners (France and Britain in the Nineteen Twenties),
without the wishes and desires of the inhabitants having been taken into
account. It was arbitrarily divided into 19 states, all made of combinations of
minorites and ethnic groups which are hostile to one another, so that every
Arab Moslem state nowadays faces ethnic social destruction from within, and in
some a civil war is already raging.5 Most of the Arabs, 118 million out
of 170 million, live in Africa, mostly in Egypt (45 million today).
Apart
from Egypt, all the Maghreb states are made up of a mixture of Arabs and
non-Arab Berbers. In Algeria there is already a civil war raging in the Kabile
mountains between the two nations in the country. Morocco and Algeria are at
war with each other over Spanish Sahara, in addition to the internal struggle
in each of them. Militant Islam endangers the integrity of Tunisia and Qaddafi
organizes wars which are destructive from the Arab point of view, from a
country which is sparsely populated and which cannot become a powerful nation.
That is why he has been attempting unifications in the past with states that
are more genuine, like Egypt and Syria. Sudan, the most torn apart state in the
Arab Moslem world today is built upon four groups hostile to each other, an
Arab Moslem Sunni minority which rules over a majority of non-Arab Africans,
Pagans, and Christians. In Egypt there is a Sunni Moslem majority facing a
large minority of Christians which is dominant in upper Egypt: some 7 million
of them, so that even Sadat, in his speech on May 8, expressed the fear that
they will want a state of their own, something like a "second"
Christian Lebanon in Egypt.
All
the Arab States east of Israel are torn apart, broken up and riddled with inner
conflict even more than those of the Maghreb. Syria is fundamentally no
different from Lebanon except in the strong military regime which rules it. But
the real civil war taking place nowadays between the Sunni majority and the
Shi'ite Alawi ruling minority (a mere 12% of the population) testifies to the
severity of the domestic trouble.
Iraq
is, once again, no different in essence from its neighbors, although its
majority is Shi'ite and the ruling minority Sunni. Sixty-five percent of the
population has no say in politics, in which an elite of 20 percent holds the
power. In addition there is a large Kurdish minority in the north, and if it
weren't for the strength of the ruling regime, the army and the oil revenues,
Iraq's future state would be no different than that of Lebanon in the past or
of Syria today. The seeds of inner conflict and civil war are apparent today
already, especially after the rise of Khomeini to power in Iran, a leader whom
the Shi'ites in Iraq view as their natural leader.
All
the Gulf principalities and Saudi Arabia are built upon a delicate house of
sand in which there is only oil. In Kuwait, the Kuwaitis constitute only a
quarter of the population. In Bahrain, the Shi'ites are the majority but are
deprived of power. In the UAE, Shi'ites are once again the majority but the
Sunnis are in power. The same is true of Oman and North Yemen. Even in the
Marxist South Yemen there is a sizable Shi'ite minority. In Saudi Arabia half
the population is foreign, Egyptian and Yemenite, but a Saudi minority holds
power.
Jordan
is in reality Palestinian, ruled by a Trans-Jordanian Bedouin minority, but
most of the army and certainly the bureaucracy is now Palestinian. As a matter
of fact Amman is as Palestinian as Nablus. All of these countries have powerful
armies, relatively speaking. But there is a problem there too. The Syrian army
today is mostly Sunni with an Alawi officer corps, the Iraqi army Shi'ite with
Sunni commanders. This has great significance in the long run, and that is why
it will not be possible to retain the loyalty of the army for a long time
except where it comes to the only common denominator: The hostility towards
Israel, and today even that is insufficient.
Alongside
the Arabs, split as they are, the other Moslem states share a similar
predicament. Half of Iran's population is comprised of a Persian speaking group
and the other half of an ethnically Turkish group. Turkey's population
comprises a Turkish Sunni Moslem majority, some 50%, and two large minorities,
12 million Shi'ite Alawis and 6 million Sunni Kurds. In Afghanistan there are 5
million Shi'ites who constitute one third of the population. In Sunni Pakistan
there are 15 million Shi'ites who endanger the existence of that state.13
This
national ethnic minority picture extending from Morocco to India and from
Somalia to Turkey points to the absence of stability and a rapid degeneration
in the entire region. When this picture is added to the economic one, we see
how the entire region is built like a house of cards, unable to withstand its
severe problems.
In
this giant and fractured world there are a few wealthy groups and a huge mass
of poor people. Most of the Arabs have an average yearly income of 300 dollars.
That is the situation in Egypt, in most of the Maghreb countries except for
Libya, and in Iraq. Lebanon is torn apart and its economy is falling to pieces.
It is a state in which there is no centralized power, but only 5 de facto
sovereign authorities (Christian in the north, supported by the Syrians and under
the rule of the Franjieh clan, in the East an area of direct Syrian conquest,
in the center a Phalangist controlled Christian enclave, in the south and up to
the Litani river a mostly Palestinian region controlled by the PLO and Major
Haddad's state of Christians and half a million Shi'ites). Syria is in an even
graver situation and even the assistance she will obtain in the future after
the unification with Libya will not be sufficient for dealing with the basic
problems of existence and the maintenance of a large army. Egypt is in the
worst situation: Millions are on the verge of hunger, half the labor force is
unemployed, and housing is scarce in this most densely populated area of the
world. Except for the army, there is not a single department operating
efficiently and the state is in a permanent state of bankruptcy and depends
entirely on American foreign assistance granted since the peace.6
In
the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt there is the largest
accumulation of money and oil in the world, but those enjoying it are tiny
elites who lack a wide base of support and self-confidence, something that no
army can guarantee.7 The Saudi army with all its
equipment cannot defend the regime from real dangers at home or abroad, and
what took place in Mecca in 1980 is only an example. A sad and very stormy
situation surrounds Israel and creates challenges for it, problems, risks but
also far-reaching opportunities for the first time since 1967. Chances are
that opportunities missed at that time will become achievable in the Eighties
to an extent and along dimensions which we cannot even imagine today.
The
"peace" policy and the return of territories, through a dependence
upon the US, precludes the realization of the new option created for us. Since
1967, all the governments of Israel have tied our national aims down to narrow
political needs, on the one hand, and on the other to destructive opinions at
home which neutralized our capacities both at home and abroad. Failing to take
steps towards the Arab population in the new territories, acquired in the
course of a war forced upon us, is the major strategic error committed by
Israel on the morning after the Six Day War. We could have saved ourselves all
the bitter and dangerous conflict since then if we had given Jordan to the
Palestinians who live west of the Jordan river. By doing that we would have
neutralized the Palestinian problem which we nowadays face, and to which we
have found solutions that are really no solutions at all, such as territorial
compromise or autonomy which amount, in fact, to the same thing.8 Today, we suddenly face immense
opportunities for transforming the situation thoroughly and this we must do in
the coming decade, otherwise we shall not survive as a state.
In
the course of the Nineteen Eighties, the State of Israel will have to go
through far-reaching changes in its political and economic regime domestically,
along with radical changes in its foreign policy, in order to stand up to the
global and regional challenges of this new epoch. The loss of the Suez Canal
oil fields, of the immense potential of the oil, gas and other natural
resources in the Sinai peninsula which is geomorphologically identical to the
rich oil-producing countries in the region, will result in an energy drain in
the near future and will destroy our domestic economy: one quarter of our
present GNP as well as one third of the budget is used for the purchase of oil.9 The search for raw materials in the
Negev and on the coast will not, in the near future, serve to alter that state
of affairs.
(Regaining)
the Sinai peninsula with its present and potential resources is
therefore a political priority which is obstructed by the Camp David and the
peace agreements. The fault for that lies of course with the present
Israeli government and the governments which paved the road to the policy of
territorial compromise, the Alignment governments since 1967. The Egyptians
will not need to keep the peace treaty after the return of the Sinai, and they
will do all they can to return to the fold of the Arab world and to the USSR in
order to gain support and military assistance. American aid is guaranteed only
for a short while, for the terms of the peace and the weakening of the U.S.
both at home and abroad will bring about a reduction in aid. Without oil and
the income from it, with the present enormous expenditure, we will not be able
to get through 1982 under the present conditions and we will have to
act in order to return the situation to the status quo which existed in Sinai
prior to Sadat's visit and the mistaken peace agreement signed with him in
March 1979.10
Israel
has two major routes through which to realize this purpose, one direct and the
other indirect. The direct option is the less realistic one because of the
nature of the regime and government in Israel as well as the wisdom of Sadat
who obtained our withdrawal from Sinai, which was, next to the war of 1973, his
major achievement since he took power. Israel will not unilaterally break the
treaty, neither today, nor in 1982, unless it is very hard pressed economically
and politically and Egypt provides Israel with the excuse to
take the Sinai back into our hands for the fourth time in our short history.
What is left therefore, is the indirect option. The economic situation in
Egypt, the nature of the regime and its pan-Arab policy, will bring about a
situation after April 1982 in which Israel will be forced to act directly or
indirectly in order to regain control over Sinai as a strategic,
economic and energy reserve for the long run. Egypt does not constitute a
military strategic problem due to its internal conflicts and it could be driven
back to the post 1967 war situation in no more than one day.11
The
myth of Egypt as the strong leader of the Arab World was demolished back in
1956 and definitely did not survive 1967, but our policy, as in the return of
the Sinai, served to turn the myth into "fact." In reality, however,
Egypt's power in proportion both to Israel alone and to the rest of the Arab
World has gone down about 50 percent since 1967. Egypt is no longer the leading
political power in the Arab World and is economically on the verge of a crisis.
Without foreign assistance the crisis will come tomorrow.12 In the short run, due to the return
of the Sinai, Egypt will gain several advantages at our expense, but only in
the short run until 1982, and that will not change the balance of power to its
benefit, and will possibly bring about its downfall. Egypt, in its present
domestic political picture, is already a corpse, all the more so if we take
into account the growing Moslem-Christian rift. Breaking Egypt down
territorially into distinct geographical regions is the political aim of Israel
in the Nineteen Eighties on its Western front.
Egypt
is divided and torn apart into many foci of authority. If Egypt falls apart,
countries like Libya, Sudan or even the more distant states will not continue
to exist in their present form and will join the downfall and
dissolution of Egypt. The vision of a Christian Coptic State in Upper Egypt
alongside a number of weak states with very localized power and without a
centralized government as to date, is the key to a historical development which
was only set back by the peace agreement but which seems inevitable in the long
run.13
The
Western front, which on the surface appears more problematic, is in fact less
complicated than the Eastern front, in which most of the events that make the
headlines have been taking place recently. Lebanon's total dissolution into
five provinces serves as a precendent for the entire Arab world including
Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula and is already following that
track. The dissolution of Syria and Iraq later on into ethnically or
religiously unqiue areas such as in Lebanon, is Israel's primary target on the
Eastern front in the long run, while the dissolution of the military power of
those states serves as the primary short term target. Syria will fall apart, in
accordance with its ethnic and religious structure, into several states such as
in present day Lebanon, so that there will be a Shi'ite Alawi state along its
coast, a Sunni state in the Aleppo area, another Sunni state in Damascus
hostile to its northern neighbor, and the Druzes who will set up a state,
maybe even in our Golan, and certainly in the Hauran and in northern
Jordan. This state of affairs will be the guarantee for peace and security
in the area in the long run, and that aim is already within our reach
today.14
Iraq,
rich in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the other, is
guaranteed as a candidate for Israel's targets. Its dissolution is even
more important for us than that of Syria. Iraq is stronger than Syria. In the
short run it is Iraqi power which constitutes the greatest threat to Israel. An
Iraqi-Iranian war will tear Iraq apart and cause its downfall at home even
before it is able to organize a struggle on a wide front against us. Every
kind of inter-Arab confrontation will assist us in the short run and will
shorten the way to the more important aim of breaking up Iraq into
denominations as in Syria and in Lebanon. In Iraq, a division into
provinces along ethnic/religious lines as in Syria during Ottoman times is
possible. So, three (or more) states will exist around the three major cities:
Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and Shi'ite areas in the south will separate from the
Sunni and Kurdish north. It is possible that the present Iranian-Iraqi
confrontation will deepen this polarization.15
The
entire Arabian peninsula is a natural candidate for dissolution due to internal
and external pressures, and the matter is inevitable especially in Saudi
Arabia. Regardless of whether its economic might based on oil remains intact or
whether it is diminished in the long run, the internal rifts and breakdowns are
a clear and natural development in light of the present political structure.16
Jordan
constitutes an immediate strategic target in the short run but not in
the long run, for it does not constitute a real threat in the long run after
its dissolution, the termination of the lengthy rule of King Hussein and
the transfer of power to the Palestinians in the short run.
There
is no chance that Jordan will continue to exist in its present structure for a
long time, and Israel's policy, both in war and in peace, ought to be directed
at the liquidation of Jordan under the present regime and the transfer of power
to the Palestinian majority. Changing the regime east of the river will also
cause the termination of the problem of the territories densely
populated with Arabs west of the Jordan. Whether in war or under conditions of
peace, emigrationfrom the territories and economic demographic freeze in them,
are the guarantees for the coming change on both banks of the river, and we
ought to be active in order to accelerate this process in the nearest future.
The autonomy plan ought also to be rejected, as well as any compromise or
division of the territories for, given the plans of the PLO and those of the
Israeli Arabs themselves, the Shefa'amr plan of September 1980, it is not
possible to go on living in this country in the present situation
without separating the two nations, the Arabs to Jordan and the Jews to the
areas west of the river. Genuine coexistence and peace will reign over the
land only when the Arabs understand that without Jewish rule between the Jordan
and the sea they will have neither existence nor security. A nation of their
own and security will be theirs only in Jordan.17
Within
Israel the distinction between the areas of '67 and the territories beyond
them, those of '48, has always been meaningless for Arabs and nowadays no
longer has any significance for us. The problem should be seen in its entirety
without any divisions as of '67. It should be clear, under any future political
situation or mifitary constellation, that the solution of the problem
of the indigenous Arabs will come only when they recognize the
existence of Israel in secure borders up to the Jordan river and beyond
it, as our existential need in this difficult epoch, the nuclear epoch
which we shall soon enter. It is no longer possible to live with three fourths
of the Jewish population on the dense shoreline which is so dangerous in a
nuclear epoch.
Dispersal
of the population is therefore a domestic strategic aim of the highest order;
otherwise, we shall cease to exist within any borders. Judea, Samaria and the
Galilee are our sole guarantee for national existence, and if we do not become
the majority in the mountain areas, we shall not rule in the country and we
shall be like the Crusaders, who lost this country which was not theirs anyhow,
and in which they were foreigners to begin with. Rebalancing the country
demographically, strategically and economically is the highest and most central
aim today. Taking hold of the mountain watershed from Beersheba to the Upper
Galilee is the national aim generated by the major strategic consideration
which is settling the mountainous part of the country that is empty of
Jews today.l8
Realizing
our aims on the Eastern front depends first on the realization of this internal
strategic objective. The transformation of the political and economic
structure, so as to enable the realization of these strategic aims, is the key
to achieving the entire change. We need to change from a centralized economy in
which the government is extensively involved, to an open and free market as
well as to switch from depending upon the U.S. taxpayer to developing, with our
own hands, of a genuine productive economic infrastructure. If we are not able
to make this change freely and voluntarily, we shall be forced into it by world
developments, especially in the areas of economics, energy, and politics, and by
our own growing isolation.l9
From
a military and strategic point of view, the West led by the U.S. is unable to
withstand the global pressures of the USSR throughout the world, and Israel
must therefore stand alone in the Eighties, without any foreign assistance,
military or economic, and this is within our capacities today, with no
compromises.20 Rapid changes in the world will
also bring about a change in the condition of world Jewry to which Israel will
become not only a last resort but the only existential option. We cannot assume
that U.S. Jews, and the communities of Europe and Latin America will continue
to exist in the present form in the future.21
Our
existence in this country itself is certain, and there is no force that could
remove us from here either forcefully or by treachery (Sadat's method). Despite
the difficulties of the mistaken "peace" policy and the problem of
the Israeli Arabs and those of the territories, we can effectively deal with
these problems in the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
Three
important points have to be clarified in order to be able to understand the
significant possibilities of realization of this Zionist plan for the Middle
East, and also why it had to be published.
The
Military Background of The Plan
The
military conditions of this plan have not been mentioned above, but on the many
occasions where something very like it is being "explained" in closed
meetings to members of the Israeli Establishment, this point is clarified. It
is assumed that the Israeli military forces, in all their branches, are
insufficient for the actual work of occupation of such wide territories as
discussed above. In fact, even in times of intense Palestinian
"unrest" on the West Bank, the forces of the Israeli Army are
stretched out too much. The answer to that is the method of ruling by means of
"Haddad forces" or of "Village Associations" (also known as
"Village Leagues"): local forces under "leaders" completely
dissociated from the population, not having even any feudal or party structure
(such as the Phalangists have, for example). The "states" proposed by
Yinon are "Haddadland" and "Village Associations," and
their armed forces will be, no doubt, quite similar. In addition, Israeli
military superiority in such a situation will be much greater than it is even
now, so that any movement of revolt will be "punished" either by mass
humiliation as in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or by bombardment and
obliteration of cities, as in Lebanon now (June 1982), or by both. In order to
ensure this,the plan, as explained orally, calls for the establishment
of Israeli garrisons in focal places between the mini states, equipped with the
necessary mobile destructive forces. In fact, we have seen something like this
in Haddadland and we will almost certainly soon see the first example of this
system functioning either in South Lebanon or in all Lebanon.
It
is obvious that the above military assumptions, and the whole plan too, depend
also on the Arabs continuing to be even more divided than they are now, and on
the lack of any truly progressive mass movement among them. It may be that
those two conditions will be removed only when the plan will be well advanced,
with consequences which can not be foreseen.
Why
it is necessary to publish this in Israel?
The
reason for publication is the dual nature of the Israeli-Jewish society: A very
great measure of freedom and democracy, specially for Jews, combined with
expansionism and racist discrimination. In such a situation the Israeli-Jewish
elite (for the masses follow the TV and Begin's speeches) has to be
persuaded. The first steps in the process of persuasion are oral, as
indicated above, but a time comes in which it becomes inconvenient. Written
material must be produced for the benefit of the more stupid
"persuaders" and "explainers" (for example medium-rank officers,
who are, usually, remarkably stupid). They then "learn it," more or
less, and preach to others. It should be remarked that Israel, and even the
Yishuv from the Twenties, has always functioned in this way. I myself well
remember how (before I was "in opposition") the necessity of war with
was explained to me and others a year before the 1956 war, and the necessity of
conquering "the rest of Western Palestine when we will have the
opportunity" was explained in the years 1965-67.
Why
is it assumed that there is no special risk from the outside in the publication
of such plans?
Such
risks can come from two sources, so long as the principled opposition inside
Israel is very weak (a situation which may change as a consequence of the war
on Lebanon) : The Arab World, including the Palestinians, and the United
States. The Arab World has shown itself so far quite incapable of a detailed
and rational analysis of Israeli-Jewish society, and the Palestinians have
been, on the average, no better than the rest. In such a situation, even those
who are shouting about the dangers of Israeli expansionism (which are real
enough) are doing this not because of factual and detailed knowledge, but
because of belief in myth. A good example is the very persistent belief in the
non-existent writing on the wall of the Knesset of the Biblical verse about the
Nile and the Euphrates. Another example is the persistent, and completely false
declarations, which were made by some of the most important Arab leaders, that
the two blue stripes of the Israeli flag symbolize the Nile and the Euphrates,
while in fact they are taken from the stripes of the Jewish praying shawl
(Talit). The Israeli specialists assume that, on the whole, the Arabs will pay
no attention to their serious discussions of the future, and the Lebanon war
has proved them right. So why should they not continue with their old methods
of persuading other Israelis?
In
the United States a very similar situation exists, at least until now. The more
or less serious commentators take their information about Israel, and much of
their opinions about it, from two sources. The first is from articles in the
"liberal" American press, written almost totally by Jewish admirers
of Israel who, even if they are critical of some aspects of the Israeli state,
practice loyally what Stalin used to call "the constructive
criticism." (In fact those among them who claim also to be
"Anti-Stalinist" are in reality more Stalinist than Stalin, with
Israel being their god which has not yet failed). In the framework of such
critical worship it must be assumed that Israel has always "good
intentions" and only "makes mistakes," and therefore such a plan
would not be a matter for discussion--exactly as the Biblical genocides
committed by Jews are not mentioned. The other source of information, The
Jerusalem Post, has similar policies. So long, therefore, as the situation
exists in which Israel is really a "closed society" to the
rest of the world, because the world wants to close its eyes, the
publication and even the beginning of the realization of such a plan is realistic
and feasible.
Israel
Shahak
June 17, 1982
Jerusalem
June 17, 1982
Jerusalem
About
the Translator
Israel
Shahak is a professor of organic chemistly at Hebrew University in Jerusalem
and the chairman of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights. He published The
Shahak Papers, collections of key articles from the Hebrew press, and is
the author of numerous articles and books, among them Non-Jew in the
Jewish State. His latest book is Israel's Global Role: Weapons for
Repression, published by the AAUG in 1982. Israel Shahak: (1933-2001)
Notes
1. American Universities Field Staff. Report
No.33, 1979. According to this research, the population of the world will be 6
billion in the year 2000. Today's world population can be broken down as
follows: China, 958 million; India, 635 million; USSR, 261 million; U.S., 218
million Indonesia, 140 million; Brazil and Japan, 110 million each. According
to the figures of the U.N. Population Fund for 1980, there will be, in 2000, 50
cities with a population of over 5 million each. The population ofthp;Third
World will then be 80% of the world population. According to Justin
Blackwelder, U.S. Census Office chief, the world population will not reach 6
billion because of hunger.
2. Soviet nuclear policy has been well summarized
by two American Sovietologists: Joseph D. Douglas and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet
Strategy for Nuclear War, (Stanford, Ca., Hoover Inst. Press, 1979). In the
Soviet Union tens and hundreds of articles and books are published each year which
detail the Soviet doctrine for nuclear war and there is a great deal of
documentation translated into English and published by the U.S. Air
Force,including USAF: Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army: The Soviet
View, Moscow, 1972; USAF: The Armed Forces of the Soviet State.
Moscow, 1975, by Marshal A. Grechko. The basic Soviet approach to the matter is
presented in the book by Marshal Sokolovski published in 1962 in Moscow:
Marshal V. D. Sokolovski, Military Strategy, Soviet Doctrine and
Concepts(New York, Praeger, 1963).
3. A picture of Soviet intentions in various
areas of the world can be drawn from the book by Douglas and Hoeber, ibid.For
additional material see: Michael Morgan, "USSR's Minerals as Strategic
Weapon in the Future," Defense and Foreign Affairs,
Washington, D.C., Dec. 1979.
4. Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, Sea
Power and the State, London, 1979. Morgan, loc. cit. General
George S. Brown (USAF) C-JCS, Statement to the Congress on the Defense
Posture of the United States For Fiscal Year 1979, p. 103; National
Security Council, Review of Non-Fuel Mineral Policy, (Washington,
D.C. 1979,); Drew Middleton, The New York Times, (9/15/79); Time,
9/21/80.
5. Elie Kedourie, "The End of the Ottoman
Empire," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No.4, 1968.
6. Al-Thawra, Syria 12/20/79, Al-Ahram,12/30/79, Al
Ba'ath, Syria, 5/6/79. 55% of the Arabs are 20 years old and younger, 70%
of the Arabs live in Africa, 55% of the Arabs under 15 are unemployed, 33% live
in urban areas, Oded Yinon, "Egypt's Population Problem," The
Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 15, Spring 1980.
7. E. Kanovsky, "Arab Haves and Have
Nots," The Jerusalem Quarterly, No.1, Fall 1976, Al
Ba'ath, Syria, 5/6/79.
8. In his book, former Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin said that the Israeli government is in fact responsible for the design of
American policy in the Middle East, after June '67, because of its own
indecisiveness as to the future of the territories and the inconsistency in its
positions since it established the background for Resolution 242 and certainly
twelve years later for the Camp David agreements and the peace treaty with
Egypt. According to Rabin, on June 19, 1967, President Johnson sent a letter to
Prime Minister Eshkol in which he did not mention anything about withdrawal
from the new territories but exactly on the same day the government resolved to
return territories in exchange for peace. After the Arab resolutions in
Khartoum (9/1/67) the government altered its position but contrary to its
decision of June 19, did not notify the U.S. of the alteration and the U.S.
continued to support 242 in the Security Council on the basis of its earlier
understanding that Israel is prepared to return territories. At that point it
was already too late to change the U.S. position and Israel's policy. From here
the way was opened to peace agreements on the basis of 242 as was later agreed
upon in Camp David. See Yitzhak Rabin. Pinkas Sherut, (Ma'ariv 1979)
pp. 226-227.
9. Foreign and Defense Committee Chairman Prof.
Moshe Arens argued in an interview (Ma 'ariv,10/3/80) that the Israeli
government failed to prepare an economic plan before the Camp David agreements
and was itself surprised by the cost of the agreements, although already during
the negotiations it was possible to calculate the heavy price and the serious
error involved in not having prepared the economic grounds for peace.
The
former Minister of Treasury, Mr. Yigal Holwitz, stated that if it were not for
the withdrawal from the oil fields, Israel would have a positive balance of
payments (9/17/80). That same person said two years earlier that the government
of Israel (from which he withdrew) had placed a noose around his neck. He was
referring to the Camp David agreements (Ha'aretz, 11/3/78). In the
course of the whole peace negotiations neither an expert nor an economics
advisor was consulted, and the Prime Minister himself, who lacks knowledge and
expertise in economics, in a mistaken initiative, asked the U.S. to give us a
loan rather than a grant, due to his wish to maintain our respect and the
respect of the U.S. towards us. See Ha'aretz1/5/79. Jerusalem
Post, 9/7/79. Prof Asaf Razin, formerly a senior consultant in the
Treasury, strongly criticized the conduct of the negotiations; Ha'aretz,
5/5/79. Ma'ariv, 9/7/79. As to matters concerning the oil fields
and Israel's energy crisis, see the interview with Mr. Eitan Eisenberg, a
government advisor on these matters, Ma'arive Weekly, 12/12/78. The
Energy Minister, who personally signed the Camp David agreements and the
evacuation of Sdeh Alma, has since emphasized the seriousness of our condition
from the point of view of oil supplies more than once...see Yediot
Ahronot, 7/20/79. Energy Minister Modai even admitted that the government
did not consult him at all on the subject of oil during the Camp David and
Blair House negotiations.Ha'aretz, 8/22/79.
10. Many sources report on the growth of the
armaments budget in Egypt and on intentions to give the army preference in a
peace epoch budget over domestic needs for which a peace was allegedly
obtained. See former Prime Minister Mamduh Salam in an interview 12/18/77,
Treasury Minister Abd El Sayeh in an interview 7/25/78, and the paper Al
Akhbar, 12/2/78 which clearly stressed that the military budget will
receive first priority, despite the peace. This is what former Prime Minister
Mustafa Khalil has stated in his cabinet's programmatic document which was
presented to Parliament, 11/25/78. See English translation, ICA, FBIS, Nov. 27.
1978, pp. D 1-10. According to these sources, Egypt's military budget increased
by 10% between fiscal 1977 and 1978, and the process still goes on. A Saudi
source divulged that the Egyptians plan to increase their militmy budget by
100% in the next two years;Ha'aretz, 2/12/79 and Jerusalem Post,
1/14/79.
11. Most of the economic estimates threw doubt on
Egypt's ability to reconstruct its economy by 1982. See Economic
Intelligence Unit, 1978 Supplement, "The Arab Republic of Egypt";
E. Kanovsky, "Recent Economic Developments in the Middle East," Occasional
Papers, The Shiloah Institution, June 1977; Kanovsky, "The Egyptian
Economy Since the Mid-Sixties, The Micro Sectors," Occasional
Papers, June 1978; Robert McNamara, President of World Bank, as reported inTimes,
London, 1/24/78.
12. See the comparison made by the researeh of
the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and research camed out in the
Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University, as well as the research by
the British scientist, Denis Champlin, Military Review, Nov. 1979,
ISS: The Military Balance 1979-1980, CSS; Security
Arrangements in Sinai...by Brig. Gen. (Res.) A Shalev, No. 3.0 CSS; The
Military Balance and the Military Options after the Peace Treaty with Egypt,
by Brig. Gen. (Res.) Y. Raviv, No.4, Dec. 1978, as well as many press reports
including El Hawadeth, London, 3/7/80; El Watan El Arabi,
Paris, 12/14/79.
13. As for religious ferment in Egypt and the
relations between Copts and Moslems see the series of articles published in the
Kuwaiti paper, El Qabas, 9/15/80. The English author Irene Beeson
reports on the rift between Moslems and Copts, see: Irene Beeson, Guardian,
London, 6/24/80, and Desmond Stewart, Middle East Internmational,
London 6/6/80. For other reports see Pamela Ann Smith, Guardian,
London, 12/24/79; The Christian Science Monitor 12/27/79 as
well as Al Dustour, London, 10/15/79; El Kefah El Arabi, 10/15/79.
14. Arab Press Service, Beirut,
8/6-13/80. The New Republic, 8/16/80, Der Spiegel as
cited by Ha'aretz, 3/21/80, and 4/30-5/5/80; The Economist,
3/22/80; Robert Fisk, Times, London, 3/26/80; Ellsworth Jones, Sunday
Times, 3/30/80.
15. J.P. Peroncell Hugoz, Le Monde,
Paris 4/28/80; Dr. Abbas Kelidar, Middle East Review, Summer 1979; Conflict
Studies, ISS, July 1975; Andreas Kolschitter, Der Zeit, (Ha'aretz,
9/21/79) Economist Foreign Report, 10/10/79, Afro-Asian
Affairs, London, July 1979.
16. Arnold Hottinger, "The Rich Arab States
in Trouble," The New York Review of Books, 5/15/80; Arab
Press Service, Beirut, 6/25-7/2/80; U.S. News and World Report,
11/5/79 as well as El Ahram, 11/9/79; El Nahar El Arabi Wal
Duwali, Paris 9/7/79; El Hawadeth, 11/9/79; David Hakham, Monthly
Review, IDF, Jan.-Feb. 79.
17. As for Jordan's policies and problems see El
Nahar El Arabi Wal Duwali, 4/30/79, 7/2/79; Prof. Elie Kedouri, Ma'ariv6/8/79;
Prof. Tanter, Davar 7/12/79; A. Safdi, Jerusalem Post,
5/31/79; El Watan El Arabi 11/28/79; El Qabas,
11/19/79. As for PLO positions see: The resolutions of the Fatah Fourth
Congress, Damascus, August 1980. The Shefa'amr program of the Israeli Arabs was
published in Ha'aretz, 9/24/80, and by Arab Press Report 6/18/80.
For facts and figures on immigration of Arabs to Jordan, see Amos Ben Vered, Ha'aretz,
2/16/77; Yossef Zuriel, Ma'ariv 1/12/80. As to the PLO's
position towards Israel see Shlomo Gazit, Monthly Review; July
1980; Hani El Hasan in an interview, Al Rai Al'Am, Kuwait 4/15/80;
Avi Plaskov, "The Palestinian Problem," Survival, ISS,
London Jan. Feb. 78; David Gutrnann, "The Palestinian Myth," Commentary,
Oct. 75; Bernard Lewis, "The Palestinians and the PLO," Commentary Jan.
75;Monday Morning, Beirut, 8/18-21/80; Journal of Palestine
Studies, Winter 1980.
18. Prof. Yuval Neeman, "Samaria--The Basis
for Israel's Security," Ma'arakhot 272-273, May/June
1980; Ya'akov Hasdai, "Peace, the Way and the Right to Know," Dvar
Hashavua, 2/23/80. Aharon Yariv, "Strategic Depth--An Israeli
Perspective," Ma'arakhot 270-271, October 1979; Yitzhak
Rabin, "Israel's Defense Problems in the Eighties," Ma'arakhotOctober
1979.
19. Ezra Zohar, In the Regime's Pliers (Shikmona,
1974); Motti Heinrich, Do We have a Chance Israel, Truth Versus Legend (Reshafim,
1981).
20. Henry Kissinger, "The Lessons of the
Past," The Washington Review Vol 1, Jan. 1978; Arthur
Ross, "OPEC's Challenge to the West," The Washington
Quarterly, Winter, 1980; Walter Levy, "Oil and the Decline of the
West,"Foreign Affairs, Summer 1980; Special Report--"Our Armed
Forees-Ready or Not?" U.S. News and World Report10/10/77;
Stanley Hoffman, "Reflections on the Present Danger," The New
York Review of Books 3/6/80; Time 4/3/80; Leopold
Lavedez "The illusions of SALT" Commentary Sept. 79;
Norman Podhoretz, "The Present Danger," CommentaryMarch
1980; Robert Tucker, "Oil and American Power Six Years Later," Commentary Sept.
1979; Norman Podhoretz, "The Abandonment of Israel," Commentary July
1976; Elie Kedourie, "Misreading the Middle East," Commentary July
1979.
21. According to figures published by Ya'akov
Karoz, Yediot Ahronot, 10/17/80, the sum total of anti-Semitic
incidents recorded in the world in 1979 was double the amount recorded in 1978.
In Germany, France, and Britain the number of anti-Semitic incidents was many
times greater in that year. In the U.S. as well there has been a sharp increase
in anti-Semitic incidents which were reported in that article. For the new
anti-Semitism, see L. Talmon, "The New Anti-Semitism," The
New Republic, 9/18/1976; Barbara Tuchman, "They poisoned the
Wells," Newsweek 2/3/75.
